Control & Corruption: The ANC’s reign in South Africa
The dominant-party system of South Africa is suffering under an incompetent, corrupt organisation with a waning grasp on the public.
Written by Marin Verspieren
When Mandela came to power in 1994 in South Africa, defeating apartheid and liberating black people in the country, he vowed to unify the country under one identity: the South African. Yet his party, the ANC, has had a long and tumultuous road to that goal, and many question if such an ideal can be achieved under their leadership. Rolling blackouts and inequality are becoming as inherent to South African life as corruption inquiries into the ANC. How has the political landscape come to this? Rewinding the clocks and tracing the origins of the ruling party and its history of corruption, we can question if an ANC-ruled South Africa can ever truly heal from its painful past.
Signs of hope
Under the oppressive regime of the Apartheid, a handful of political activists came together in 1912 to create the African National Congress (ANC) as a liberation party for the disenfranchised: black South Africans. Under this liberating ideal, the ANC worked to revolt against the regime, and was involved in riots, attacks, and demonstrations. This culminated in the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, a protest of 7,000 black citizens demonstrated against a local police station and were fired upon, killing 69. The party was made illegal. This hampered the power and influence the ANC could hold, and it became an underground unit, resorting to guerrilla warfare against the state. By that time, western countries such as the USA and the UK denounced the party as a terrorist organisation. Its legitimacy was only reinstated in 1990, 30 years later, as it climbed out of the struggle against Apartheid and became a leading voice for its abolition, which was achieved a few years later. When Apartheid was abolished in 1994, the ANC took power under the presidency of Nelson Mandela.
But the long walk to freedom would be more complicated to attain than originally thought. The party, which has historically fought the regime from the position of the underdog, was suddenly thrust into an important role of ruling over a comparatively powerful African state. The ANC would ride “on the back of public euphoria about the Rainbow Nation” and benefit from “the administrative sinews left by the departed apartheid state.”1 This allowed the party to fake success for a few years, but cracks of interest were already beginning to show. Reportedly, Mandela warned in 1997 that the “ANC was changing negatively […] since it became a governing party” because people started joining “as a route to power and self-enrichment.”2 This warning is echoed more than 20 years later by the president who followed him after his stepping down in 1999: Thabo Mbeki. Under his presidency, which “sought to impose a sere, technocratic and welfarist vision on his realm”3, corruption increased dramatically. Namely, in 2004, the Oilgate scandal accused the oil giant Imvume of funneling R11 million of state money directly to the ANC ahead of the 2004 general elections. In the article that broke the story, Mail & Guardian described Imuvme as “effectively a front for the ruling party”.4
A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing
Moving from Mbeki, the next president is by far the most infamous figure when discussing corruption in South Africa: Jacob Zuma. When he was elected in December 2007, and later took office in 2008, he was already under investigation for corruption over an Arms Deal that took place in the late 1990s. The Strategic Defense Procurement Package was a purchase of weaponry and military equipment in 1999 to equip the post-apartheid government. This R55 billion deal (approximately $7 billion today) was highly controversial due to allegations of bribery and transparency issues. His financial advisor, Schabir Shaik, utilised Zuma’s position in government to secure favorable company bids for military contracts, in exchange for bribes. Shaik was convicted of corruption in 2005 and given a sentence of 15 years in prison, but ended up only serving 2 years. The charges on Zuma were carried for a few years until they were dropped on a legal technicality regarding prosecution delays.
One of Zuma’s first acts of parliament was the call to disband the Scorpions, an elite anti-corruption investigation team founded in 2001 that was directly involved in the allegations against Zuma during the Arms Deal affair. While their role was controversial, this act was largely seen as a political maneuever to protect ANC members from scrutiny. Their replacement, the Hawks, “remain within the South Africa Police Service (SAPS)” which “gives the National Commissioner immense influence over its members” and are bound by police law.5 Additionally, the Protection of State Information Bill was enacted in 2011 under Jacob Zuma, a controversial legislation that protects sensitive government information and enables the state to prosecute whistleblowers for publishing such information.
Zuma’s presidency was plagued by more allegations of corruption and self-enrichment schemes. Namely, his close ties to the Gupta Family - a powerful and influential group of people operating beyond the law - eroded much of what was left of his reputation. Allegations of exploitation of political power for personal enrichment for the Guptas were common in the fields of mining and technology. Combined with economic decay and voter distrust, the build-up pressure led to his eventual resignation in 2018. Within a month of Zuma’s stepping down, the Arms Deal charges were brought back up, and the case is still ongoing. Yet, the first part of a 4-year-long investigation into corruption and state capture was released in 2022 by the Zondo Commission in a 900-page report. It details evidence of cronyism and the draining of state money by Zuma and others during his presidency, proved by the testimony of over 250 witnesses and 150,000 pages of documents.
A Party in Decline
Scandals of corruption have been quieter since the appointment of Cyril Ramaphosa, the current South African president. That said, it would be foolish to claim that these crimes have gone away with Zuma, as shown by his extensive network and reach in other state institutions. In any case, the reputation of the ANC has been irreversibly tarnished by its history, and voting behaviour has made it clear. In the 2021 Municipal Elections, the ANC claimed, for the first time post-apartheid, less than 50% of the votes. While this might show a path away from the ANC, its alternatives are equally bleak. This is exemplified by the parties trailing the ANC: the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Party (EFF). The DA has been attempting to win over the median voter, but is still considered the white man’s party, and has seen a decrease in popularity (from 27% in 2016 to 22% in 2021). Alternatively, the EFF “is unashamedly black and exclusivist: a nativist and racist organisation of provocateurs”, and has seen steady growth (from 8% in 2016 to 11% in 2021).67
The ANC’s track is marred by persistent levels of incompetence and apathy, tracing back since it took hold of office. It also now exists in a post-Zuma era, with the reputation that comes along with it, and rotten roots that permeate every dimension of national power. With the next general elections next year, the future of South African politics is uncertain. While some might see the country as doomed, others have hope for a future with higher scrutiny in government and a reformist ideology. Only time will tell which group is right.
Pottinger, Brian. “The ANC Destroyed South Africa.” UnHerd, 5 Nov. 2021, unherd.com/2021/11/how-the-anc-destroyed-south-africa/.
Gerber, Canny Maphanga and Jan. “ANC Has Failed to Keep People Seeking “Self-Enrichment” out of Party.” News24, www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/anc-has-failed-to-keep-people-seeking-self-enrichment-out-of-party-20211029.
Ibid [1]
Author, Stefaans Brmmer, Sam Sole. “Oilgate Company Was ANC Front.” The Mail & Guardian, 15 July 2005, mg.co.za/article/2005-07-15-oilgate-company-was-anc-front/. Accessed 29 Nov. 2023.
Tamukamoyo, Hamadziripi. “Independence in South Africa’s Anti-Corruption Architecture: Failures and Prospects.” The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation, no. 71, 2013.
Ibid [1]
“Municipal Elections 2021 - Electoral Commission of South Africa.” Www.elections.org.za, www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021.
Bibliography
Author, Stefaans Brmmer, Sam Sole. “Oilgate Company Was ANC Front.” The Mail & Guardian, 15 July 2005, mg.co.za/article/2005-07-15-oilgate-company-was-anc-front/. Accessed 29 Nov. 2023.
Gerber, Canny Maphanga and Jan. “ANC Has Failed to Keep People Seeking “Self-Enrichment” out of Party.” News24, www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/anc-has-failed-to-keep-people-seeking-self-enrichment-out-of-party-20211029.
Gumede, William. “ANC Corruption Is a Major Cause of South Africa’s Failure – and the Polls Will Show It | William Gumede.” The Guardian, The Guardian, 8 May 2019, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/08/anc-corruption-south-africa-failure-polls.
Harper, Paddy. “Existential Crisis — ANC Membership Drops by More than One Third in Five Years.” The Mail & Guardian, 18 Dec. 2022, mg.co.za/politics/2022-12-18-existential-crisis-anc-membership-drops-by-more-than-one-third-in-five-years/. Accessed 29 Nov. 2023.
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report: Part 1. 2022.
“Municipal Elections 2021 - Electoral Commission of South Africa.” Www.elections.org.za, www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021.
Pottinger, Brian. “The ANC Destroyed South Africa.” UnHerd, 5 Nov. 2021, unherd.com/2021/11/how-the-anc-destroyed-south-africa/.
Rupiah, Kiri. “The ANC Is in Trouble – yet They May Be Safe for Now.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, 3 Aug. 2022, www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2022-08/anc-trouble-yet-they-may-be-safe-now.
Tamukamoyo, Hamadziripi. “Independence in South Africa’s Anti-Corruption Architecture: Failures and Prospects.” The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation, no. 71, 2013.
“The Sharpeville Massacre - a Watershed in South Africa by Reverend Ambrose Reeves | South African History Online.” Web.archive.org, 24 June 2013, web.archive.org/web/20130624221322/www.sahistory.org.za/topic/sharpeville-massacre-watershed-south-africa-reverend-ambrose-reeves.
Ramaphosa's unwillingness to personally fight corruption suggests the status quo remains unchanged. And his BEE billions is theft legalised for power. The DA deeply corrupt but better at marketing. I find it extremely difficult to see light ahead.