Checkmate, How Azerbaijan Seized the Political Moment to Defeat Armenia
While the world fixated upon Ukraine, another major war was fought and won in the Post Soviet Union.
Written by Josh Schlicht
Azerbaijani soldiers marched past remnants of a bygone era as they staged their victory parade in Khankendi, the regional capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. Abandoned homes, cars, and businesses produced a deafening silence for the victorious as they meandered through the conquered city. One hundred thousand Armenians had fled in the preceding days, taking their futures and the city’s prior name of Stepanakert with them. In a triumphant speech to soldiers, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated:
“We showed the whole world the strength, determination and indomitable spirit of the Azerbaijani people”
The fall of Stepanakert, and Aliyev’s proclamation of victory, serve not only as a decisive conclusion to a thirty year war, but also as a key case study in implementing successful aggressive statecraft in the modern era.
The region of Nagorno-Karabakh holds a significant historical and religious place in the hearts of Armenians and Azeris alike. Populated with a majority Armenian makeup, the mountainous and remote region was permitted to maintain autonomous statehood within the Azerbaijan SSR for the duration of the Soviet Union. However, the fall of communism gave people “the ability to create, and the ability to hate”1. Sporadic ethnic violence reached a peak in 1991, as both nations declared independence and claimed the region as their own. This violence culminated in an especially horrific incident, known as the Khojaly massacre2, in which over 600 Azerbaijani villagers were slaughtered by Armenian militants. Fearing a similar fate, thousands of Azerbaijanis fled East. Tens of thousands more marched West to war.
The war in Nagorno Karabakh raged for nearly three years, with a Russian brokered ceasefire being agreed upon in 1994. Despite significant military advantages in armor, aircraft, and infantry, Azerbaijan performed very poorly against entrenched Armenian fighters. Mountain combat and cold brought ruin to the attacking forces, who lost nearly 20,000 soldiers in the struggle. Under the 1994 peace agreement, Armenia was able to retain de-facto control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas. However, their territorial gains in Nagorno-Karabakh, which they titled Artsakh, were widely viewed as illegitimate, and the international community did not recognize the land as Armenian territory.
For two and a half decades a tentative peace prevailed in the region. The years following Communism brought immense changes to the Caucasus nations, but while Armenia floundered on fruit, liquor and tobacco exports, Azerbaijan made tens of billions selling oil. Azerbaijan’s military strength grew tremendously alongside its economy. By early 2020, Azerbaijan was spending $3 billion a year on military expenditures while Armenian investments fell short of $800 million3.
Dining in the East & Buttering Up the West
Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has forged several critical alliances and economic partnerships abroad in his twenty year reign. His most crucial connection is with Turkey’s Erdogan. Both leaders, who are widely characterized as autocrats4, share ethno-nationalistic visions of “Turkic unity”5 and a burning disdain for Armenia. Aliyev utilized his close relationship with Erdogan to facilitate the purchase of scores of state-of-the-art Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones6. These high-tech unmanned machines would prove to be an incredibly beneficial investment for the coming conflict.
Azerbaijan’s military preparations were aided by their special efforts to persuade elites abroad. Their strategy became known as ‘caviar diplomacy’7. Azerbaijan spent US$ 2.9 billion between 2012-2014 lobbying US and EU politicians in one slush fund alone8. In addition, Azerbaijan formed key economic ties with nations close and far, serving as key trade partners to Israel and Italy simultaneously. These various political and economic deals helped insulate Azerbaijan from international condemnation and sanctions when they inevitably made their move on the contested region.
A story in three maps: From left to right, Armenia’s line of control post 1994, Nagorno Karabakh under Russian peacekeepers, and the borders as of 2023.
Crisis Opportunities: Covid and Ukraine
The pandemic turned the world inward as leaders battled their respective domestic crises. Azerbaijan played the international political moment to their advantage. Six months into the global outbreak, Aliyev’s forces launched a shock military offensive. With tanks on the ground, and new high-tech drones above, Azerbaijan’s military made quick work of an antiquated and ill-prepared enemy. Azerbaijani forces drove the Armenian defenders back to the internationally recognized border, and surrounded the Nagorno Karabakh region. The war was a resounding tactical and psychological defeat for Armenia. The brief conflict exacted a terrible toll, costing Armenia thousands of soldiers and displacing tens of thousands more. A Russian brokered ceasefire saved the nation from total defeat, but stipulated a full withdrawal of Armenian troops from the Nagorno-Karabakh region with only a limited Russian peacekeeping force to deter full Azerbaijani victory.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine doomed Armenia’s hopes in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia was relying on Russia’s indefinite occupation of the region and support for the mutual defense clause outlined by the CSTO9. However, the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine has been extremely draining on Russian military assets. Any spare resources were redirected West, and the peace keeping force grew smaller and smaller.
Comprehensive and relentless sanctions economically isolated Russia from the West and forced it to look South and East. Azerbaijan seized the opportunity to become a crucial trade facilitator for Russian imports and exports through the Caspian Sea, making them indispensable to Russia. By summer of 2023, all Russian peacekeepers in the Nagorno-Karabakh region had been removed.
In September of 2023, Azerbaijani forces marched relatively undeterred into the heart of the region. By November, the self-proclaimed Artsakh Government was dissolved and a hundred thousand Armenians had fled West to safety in Armenia. Azerbaijan had won.
Lessons Learned
Armenia was taught a brutal lesson about power and geopolitics in the modern world. There is no international community coming to the rescue and no Russian superpower to keep the Caucuses at peace.
Azerbaijan had sensed this shifting dynamic for decades. They formed indispensable trade connections abroad, played the Western political system against itself, and dealt with the ailing power of Russia in a tactical and cautious manner. Azerbaijan's triumphant takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh shows that the evolving landscape of geopolitical power favors bold, cunning and opportunistic actors.
Sources:
Remnick, David. Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire. Random House, 1993.
de Waal, Thomas. Black Garden : Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. ISBN 978-0-8147-7082-5. OCLC 1242726645
Armstrong, Martin. “Chart: Military Spending: How Azerbaijan Surpassed Armenia.” Statista, 20 September 2023, https://www.statista.com/chart/30875/military-spending-and-gdp-of-azerbaijan-and-armenia/.
Kurlantzick, Joshua. “Perspective | Dictators are using the coronavirus to strengthen their grip on power.” Washington Post, 3 April 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/dictators-are-using-the-coronavirus-to-strengthen-their-grip-on-power/2020/04/02/c36582f8-748c-11ea-87da-77a8136c1a6d_story.html.
“Azerbaijani leader Aliyev hails 'brotherhood, friendship' between Azerbaijan, Turkey.” Daily Sabah, 16 September 2020, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/azerbaijani-leader-aliyev-hails-brotherhood-friendship-between-azerbaijan-turkey.
Ege, Burak. “Azerbaijan to buy armed drones from Turkey.” Defense News, 25 June 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2020/06/25/azerbaijan-to-buy-armed-drones-from-turkey/
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Wrate, Jonny. “Baku’s Man in America.” OCCRP, 23 May 2018, https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/bakus-man-in-america.
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