Venezuela, Guyana, and The Essequibo region - An Imminent War or Political Posturing?

Will Maduro Invade a Sovereign Nation or is this all Political Theater?

Written by Ben Kwasnik

A month ago, Venezuela reached an agreement with the United States in Barbados, which would pave the way for Venezuela to transition to free and fair elections in 2024. In exchange, the US lifted crippling sanctions on Venezuela’s economy. Venezuela allowed primaries to be held for opposition parties, however they quickly reneged on their promises, annulling the vote and claiming fraud. A month later, Venezuela is pressing ahead with a referendum that would annex the oil rich Essequibo region, which constitutes two-thirds of Guyana’s territory. What is the history of this disputed territory, and will interstate War return to South America for the first time in decades? 

Essequibo - a history

The Essequibo territory constitutes two-thirds of Guyana, runs from the Essequibo River west to the border of Venezuela, and has been the subject of numerous claims by different nations.  The Dutch and Spanish signed a treaty in 1648 that recognised the Netherlands’ ownership of the territory east of the Essequibo River, but the Dutch colonised their way much further West. In the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814, the territory was ceded to Britain, in exchange for the UK returning to the Netherlands some of its Asian territories which it had occupied during the Napoleonic wars. It was unclear, however, where exactly the border lay, and Venezuela protested Britain’s occupation of the territory West of the Essequibo River, stating that the Dutch (and then British) had seized it illegally. The matter remained unresolved and unimportant for years until the discovery of mass gold deposits in 1876, which led to both Venezuela and the British increasing their interest in the area. Both countries reiterated their claims, which led to hostility, and ultimately led to Venezuela severing diplomatic ties with the UK in 1887. In 1894, after Venezuela successfully lobbied the US to intervene owing to their ‘Monroe Doctrine’, the British accepted arbitration on the territory. Both countries signed The Treaty of Washington, with 2 British judges, 2 American judges, and a 5th Russian judge on the panel, who was presumed neutral. After two years of pleadings the panel ruled unanimously in favour of the UK, an outcome which Venezuela has never accepted, claiming collusion between the UK and Russia.

In 1949, a post-mortem memorandum from the Offical Secretary of the US-Venezuela delegation was released. The Document confirmed Venezuela's suspicion of collusion. The Russian jurist had rigged the panel against Venezuela's claim. This formed the basis for an increased antagonism by Venezuela against British control of the Essequibo region, and almost led to an invasion in 1958 by the then-dictator, Marcos Jimenez before he was replaced in a coup. Things became more complicated in 1966, when Guyana became independent from the UK, as Venezuela’s claim no longer revolved around decolonisation. The 1966 Geneva Agreement was signed between Venezuela, the UK, and the New State of Guyana and was chaired by the UN, which committed to finding a peaceful agreement based on international law, and a moratorium on violence. After the agreement, Venezuela lost interest in the territory, with Hugo Chavez in 2004 stating that he considered the matter ‘settled’ in his 2004 visit to Guyana’s capital Georgetown. Much like in 1876, however, the discovery of natural resources in the Essequibo region brought the issue back to the political limelight. This time, the resources were oil - with Essequibo’s reserves alone enough to make it the 17th largest oil producer in the world. 

Maduro and Essequibo

Nicolas Maduro’s government has become increasingly authoritarian and repressive since he assumed power since 2014, and Venezuela’s complete economic collapse has spurred internal crisis. Around 25% of the nation’s population has left since 2015, inflation has been rampant, and the vast majority of the country lives in absolute poverty. Maduro has used brutal methods to control Venezuela, strengthening the army’s power, and increasing state-censorship. Anti-colonial rhetoric has been fundamental in shaping Chavez and Maduro's policies and ideologies. Hugo Chavez regularly spoke about how Venezuela and Cuba were the Latin American vanguard against the US’s imperialism, and that there needed to be a resistance against colonial powers. As Essequibo was initially taken by the UK from Venezuela, their claim to the land was rooted in anti-colonialism, and the restoration of land to colonised peoples. Maduro has used this anti-colonial rhetoric in his current stance on Essequibo - stating “Guyana is controlled by ExxonMobil”. Maduro increasingly put Venezuela’s territorial claims at the centre of his political agenda, vowing to “reconquer” the territory in 2021, as well as commissioning the state-sponsored ‘Our Essequibo’ film. On the 5th of October, Maduro announced that a referendum would be held on December 3rd. The referendum will ask five questions, some of which concern rejecting the historical rulings that Essequibo belongs to Guyana, but the fifth question is the most controversial:

“Do you agree with the creation of the Guayana Esequiba state and the development of an accelerated plan for comprehensive care for the current and future population of that territory, which includes, among others, the granting of citizenship and identity card? Venezuela, in accordance with the Geneva Agreement and International Law, consequently incorporating said state on the map of Venezuelan territory?”

While Madura’s government has stated that the referendum’s results are non-binding, the referendum could act as a causus belli to invade and annex the region. Maduro has assured that the referendum will go ahead, and it is likely to pass by a wide margin, with dissidents likely to not turnout, and with Venezuela’s elections widely considered to be fraudulent anyway. It is also worth noting that most Venezuelans genuinely do believe that the territory is legitimately Venezuelan. Venezuela has also mobilised 350,000 troops in order ‘to ensure the smooth running of the election’, however this could merely be a pretext for a mobilisation to annex Essequibo. There have been reports that Venezuela has moved swathes of troops to the border region, prompting Brazil to mobilise elements of its army and send them to the northern border in response.

Timing is everything

The timing of Venezuela’s referendum is in stark contrast to their conciliatory tones that they struck in Barbados with the US. In the Barbados deal, Venezuela and the US signed an agreement which lifted their harshest sanctions on Venezuela in exchange for the commitment to free and fair elections. After the Barbados Treaty, Venezuela’s opposition held its primaries, and with a reported turnout of 2.2 million votes, Maria Machado won handsomely. Machado has rallied against the referendum, calling it a “distraction”, and this has led Maduro to attack Machado on the grounds of being anti-patriotic, and in favour of the US. With Nicolas Maduro having been charged for narco-trafficking, and being on the US’ ‘narco-terrorism’ list, he will certainly want to avoid the same fate as Manuel Noriega. He will understand that should he lose power, his future is likely in a jail cell in the US. Clinging onto power, therefore, is Maduro’s priority, and winning wars almost always inspires a nationalist surge, and increases the incumbent government’s popularity. It is also a classic tactic from the authoritarian playbook, used by Leopoldo Galtieri in 1982 invading the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, whose initial success led to a patriotic furore. With elections due to be held next year, while likely fraudulent, Maduro will relish the chance to improve his popularity. Seizing the Essequibo region would be a huge boon for him, not only in terms of annexing the oil-rich region, but for his own propaganda and image. While it would almost certainly revert the lifting of the US’ sanctions, Maduro might already view this as a foregone conclusion, since it is very unlikely he has any genuine intention on abiding by the deal anyway. 

Venezuela's timing for a potential invasion coincides with the unique geopolitical situation that has inundated the liberal international order. As witnessed in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the global institutions which once safeguarded small nations have lost their ability to effectively deter invasions. During America’s time as the global superpower, both in military and economic might, they acted as the ‘world policeman’, largely preventing conflicts such as these from breaking out. With America’s increased isolationism and fatigue from intervention in global conflicts, and with their focus on Ukraine, Israel, and China, they simply do not have the bandwidth to focus on all conflicts at once. With the US, and the ‘Western’ global powers distracted, a military intervention on Guyana’s behalf seems unlikely. The Venezuelan Army, however, has had major issues with corruption, outdated equipment, and poor training. They would likely be decimated by any competent modern military power, should any coalition be able to form.

Regional Geopolitical contentions 

Given the current global situation, an active American intervention in the event of an invasion seems out of the equation; their response would likely be to reimpose sanctions. The other major players involve Russia, China, and other regional powers. Russia would probably support Venezuela’s invasion of Guyana, as for Russia it would mean less western attention on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the US would be even more stretched, limiting its bandwidth, resources and desire to further aid Ukraine. Further, a large hope behind the Barbados deal was to bring Venezuela back into the international fold, and bring their oil and gas into global markets, giving the US and other Western powers an alternative to Russia and Middle Eastern producers, with both of the latter marred by geopolitical uncertainty. Should Venezuela, and the oil-rich state of Essequibo, all be under Western sanctions, it would further increase reliance on Russia’s oil and gas, thereby strengthening their negotiating position. China has recently upgraded its relations with Venezuela to ‘all-weather’ relations, and having Venezuela sanctioned against the US would place them firmly in China’s camp, should China invade Taiwan, and ensure that they have a trusted provider of oil. Regionally, Latin American leaders do not look set to intervene. Colombia’s President - Petro - is left-wing, and has his own issues domestically with his popularity plummeting; any intervention on his behalf seems highly unlikely. Brazil has mobilised its army around the border region, but has stated that Venezuela’s referendum is an ‘internal affair’. CARICOM - the community of Caribbean states, has expressed its solidarity with Guyana, but it lacks the international clout or the military means to support Guyana. If there ever was a moment for Venezuela to retake Essequibo, it is now. The World Order is under extreme stress, the United States is preoccupied, and Venezuela's neighbors will not intervene.

The likelihood of war 

The crux of the issue is whether the referendum is an immediate causus belli, or if there is an ulterior motive. The ulterior motive likely lies in mobilising domestic support around the regime, by beating the patriotic and anti-colonial drum, and this can be reflected in the images shared by the Venezuelan media of citizens in the street rather than its army preparing for war. Luis Vicente León, who runs Caracas-based research firm Datanálisis, has said “It’s also a test of the government’s capacity to engage its political machinery and mobilise voters. Alongside that, it pressures the opposition to take a position on a sensitive subject and gives [Maduro] a potential excuse to declare a state of emergency and avoid the election altogether.” Maduro hopes to mobilise around 12 million voters, which would bolster his domestic support. 

Perhaps the biggest reason why Maduro would not invade immediately is because he does not need to. When Leopoldo Galtieri invaded the Falklands in 1982, his position seemed untenable, facing widespread opposition and protests. Maduro, on the other hand, appears to have weathered Venezuela’s economic storm and strengthened his grip on power - he has no immediate threat to his regime, and the US is aware of this, which led to them ending their ‘maximum pressure’ strategy that tried to oust him. While Datánalisis notes that he only has a 20% approval rating, he has control of the military, and Venezuela’s elites still support him. Maduro could hold back on invading Guyana as a last resort to save his regime, should it face an existential threat. Further, as Theodore Kahn of Control Risks notes, “an actual invasion would shut the door to further negotiations with the US and force the Biden administration to reimpose oil sector sanctions.” An invasion would paint Maduro and Venezuela into a corner, whereas having a ‘causus belli’ that he can use whenever he wants to gives him another bargaining chip. The US understands that Maduro, on the back of the referendum, could invade Essequibo and expropriate American assets, which strengthens his negotiating position. As the US-Venezuela deal on the lifting of sanctions progresses, Maduro can use the threat of an invasion of Guyana to prevent the re-imposition of sanctions. Thus, it appears that the threat of invading Essequibo is more useful politically to Maduro than actually invading would be, both to drum up popular support domestically, and to use as leverage in negotiations with America. The only reason why Maduro would invade now is if he calculates that, with the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine ongoing, now is a unique opportunity to capitalise. Although an immediate invasion might appear unlikely, nothing can be ruled out in the current geopolitical climate, and with Maduro at the helm.