This is an op-ed. All opinions expressed are the author’s own.
President Theodore Roosevelt once said: “Speak softly and carry a big stick”. What he really should have said is: “Speak sternly, carry big stick…and be prepared to use it”. Over 1,000 days into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and as Europe looks ahead to a Trump second term, it is more important than ever that we re-build the credibility of our deterrence against Russia.
Back in February 2024, President Macron — responding to whether France would ever send troops to Ukraine — replied: “I'm not ruling anything out, because we are facing someone who is not ruling anything out. We have undoubtedly been too hesitant by defining the limits of our action to someone who no longer has any”. Macron’s comments were ill received. 68% of the French population thought his statement was “wrong”. And abroad key NATO members — including the United Kingdom, Germany, and United States — distanced themselves from his so-called brinksmanship.
Putin, meanwhile, has had no qualms lobbing threats at the West throughout the war. On Tuesday, responding to the United States’ welcome but belated permission for Ukraine to use long-range missiles within Russian territory (ATACMs), Putin has gone ahead and revised Russia’s nuclear doctrine. The updated doctrine muddies the water regarding possible situations where Moscow would consider nuclear force. It states that “aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, with the participation of support of nuclear state, will be treated a joint attack on the Russian Federation”. And it has lowered the red line threshold from an “existential” threat to Russian territory and sovereignty to a “critical” one.
But we should recognise that it is a sign of weakness not strength. Moscow consistently engages in nuclear “sabre-rattling” precisely because it lacks other credible leverage. Further, lowering the risk threshold for nuclear use stokes symbolic fear — but in actuality undermines Russia’s nuclear credibility. Would Putin respond to US-supplied Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure with atomic weapons? It is highly unlikely, so the revised doctrine should be taken with a pinch of salt.
The United States’ and UK’s moves this week on long range missiles are promising — providing Ukraine with more to work with in the run-up to an espoused Trump ‘peace deal’ in 2025. But, more broadly, the Western approach to deterrence must be reconsidered. Olaf Scholz has indicated that Germany does not look as if it will follow the US and UK precedent with respect to its own Taurus missiles. Indeed Scholz's attitude to the war has been deeply tenuous — despite his grandiose speech back in 2022 where he declared Germany had shifted from the appeasing strategy of ‘Ostpolitik’ to a new era of rearmament (Zeitenwende). So as long as there is still disunity in Western appetites for deterrence, Putin can still sow a form of ‘deterrence through division’.
And if we once again revert to Macron, the fact is that — back in March — he had a point: sending troops to Ukraine should not be ruled out. Not because we should be putting boots on the ground, but because from a strategic point of view ruling it out as a possibility undermines our deterrence credibility. It does so because it limits our room to respond to further potential Russian escalation and red-line crossing. Europe needs to avoid escalation, of course, but also must refrain from self-deterring.
Certainly, Western nations are spending more on defence — and this is important. According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute military spending in Central and Western Europe is now higher than the final year of the Cold War. Between 2022-2023 total defence spending in Europe increased by 16%.
But increasing defence capabilities is not enough. Deterrence also requires credibility. And credibility is made up two parts. First, intent: the willingness to respond if red lines are crossed. Here, communication of intent is essential — Europe’s shy response to Macron’s assertion back in March is precisely the type of rhetoric failure which gives Putin escalation dominance over the West.
The second element of credibility is preparedness. In late 2022, it was reported that Germany only had enough ammunition to last two days of conflict. Advanced weaponry such as Storm Shadow missiles are important, but less critical than the basics needed to fight. Ukraine has proven this: whilst long-range capabilities and F-16s will be critical, one of the most powerful weapons in the conflict so far has been cheap disposable drones worth $100. Preparedness demands getting the basics right first. This will be important not just for NATO to protect itself, but also to ensure that any future security guarantees in a hypothetical ‘peace deal’ are credible.
But is Ukraine worth the risk, especially given the prospect of a Trump presidency sheathing its support, leaving Europe to collect the broken glass? This will be an increasingly frequent question as we the prospect of a ‘peace deal’ (whatever that looks like) creeps up on Ukraine under the pressure of a new Trump administration. The answer lies in what the deterrence theorist Thomas Schelling once described as “the interdependence of commitments”. The theory espouses that “Few parts of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves, especially when taken slice by slice, but defending them or running risk to protect them may preserve one’s commitments to action in other parts of the world and at later times”.
If Putin wins (or gains a highly favourable deal) and robust security guarantees are not provided, Russia will become the dominant power in Europe. Moscow will be free to increase sabotage, espionage, election interference, economic warfare, foreign assassinations and grey-zone conflict. Such a prospect is not some far-off potential reality, it is already happening. In October, Moscow was suspected of placing an incendiary device on a cargo plane in Birmingham, which thankfully did not detonate mid-flight.
We are in danger of becoming the frog gradually being heated in water, only realising our situation when we have reached boiling point. As we move into a 2025 which may lead to a peace deal and the drawing up of security guarantees for Ukraine, Europe must remind itself that capability is not enough — the West must make its deterrence credible once again.
Guy Ward Jackson holds a MA in intelligence & international security from King's College London: Check out his Linkedin here